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The Future of Gold
Kenneth W. Dam*
Changes in the international monetary system,
whether by reform or evolution, are heavily influ-
enced by political and economic developments.
Those developments, by their nature, are difficult
if not impossible to predict. Changes in the inter-
national monetary system are therefore also hard
to foresee.
Only in retrospect can one detect a steady line of
development from the gold standard to Bretton
Woods to the current system. Even the interna-
tional monetary events of a particular decade have
seldom been anticipated by reigning opinion at the
outset of that decade. Few would have predicted
in 1910, the zenith of the international gold stand-
ard, that it would collapse four years later. In 1940
few would have foreseen that the Second World
War would lead to a massive postwar planning
exercise culminating in a scheme as ambitious as
the Bretton Woods system and the International
Monetary Fund. The end of the dollar shortage
and the onset of the "dollar problem" in the 1950s
were not generally recognized until after they had
occurred. And although informed observers in
1970 realized that the U.S. commitment to sell
gold at $35 per ounce might soon be abrogated,
few anticipated either the 1973 move to general-
ized floating or the fundamental alterations in the
world oil market that emerged during the ensuing
decade.
Any discussion of issues concerning gold in the
1980s should make a sharp distinction between the
role of gold in the international monetary system
and the steps that might be taken with respect to the
International Monetary Fund's holdings of gold.
The latter is likely to be on the agenda even if, and
perhaps especially if, gold is somehow actually
phased out of the international monetary system.
The Fund's 100 odd million ounces of gold
represent an enormous body of assets, especially at
Harold J. and Marion F. Green Professor in International
Legal Studies, currently on leave of absence from the Law
School to serve as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. This paper
has been adapted from Mr. Dam's book The Rules of the
Game. Reform and Evolution in the International Monetary
System, chapter nine. The book, published in 1982 by the
University of Chicago Press, was completed before Mr. Dam
became U.S. Deputy Secretary of State. It is reprinted in
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the gold prices experienced in recent years. The
fertile minds of Fund and national officials 4o not
fail to consider ways of using those assets to r6medy
the limitations of the Fund and of other reserve
assets.
Reform initiatives of one kind or another are
likely to be successful in harnessing the financial
power embodied in the Fund's gold. Whether the
role of gold in the international monetary system
will yield to such reform initiatives is a different
question. Certainly U.S. and IMF officials seeking
"to phase gold out of the system" found that
incantation accomplished little, even when the
Fund's Articles of Agreement were amended to
replace gold formally with the Special Drawing
Right.' As the manager of the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements observed in 1980, "Gold may
have no official status in the monetary system. But
it is not unloved."'
Indeed, it is far from clear what objective indi-
cators could be established to tell an observer
whether, at any particular time, gold was becom-
ing more or less important in the international
monetary system. It is not even possible to say
with any conviction whether gold was a more or
less important factor at the end of the 1970s than
it was, say, at the time generalized floating began
in 1973. Although the Fund Articles of Agreement
accorded it a less important role, its greatly
increased price made it, when valued at market
prices, a much larger portion of world reserves.
The free market price of gold rose for the first
time above $250 per ounce in 1979, reaching a
peak of more than $800 per ounce in early 1980,
and then returned to the $300-$700 range.' The
effect on market price valuation of gold reserves
was dramatic. By the end of 1979 official world
gold reserves increased in market value to $485
billion, whereas nongold reserves totaled only $355
billion. Just three years earlier, at the end of 1976,
the comparable figures had been $136 billion and
$216 billion respectively. As a result, it has been
'The Report to Board of Governors by Committee of
Twenty, 14 June 1974, declared that "the SDR should become
the principal reserve asset, with the role of gold and of reserve
currencies being reduced." IMF, International Monetary
Reforn Documents of the Committee of Twenty (1974), p. 5.
'Rene Larre, quoted in David Marsh, "Gold Supplies Get
Wise to a Surge in Demand," Financial Times 7 July 1980.
'Bank for International Settlements 49th Report 1979, p.
152; BIS 50th Report 1980, pp. 147-48; BIS 53rd Report 1983,
p. 154; Michael G. Martin, "The Changing Gold Market,
1978-80," Finance and Development 17 (December 1980):
40-43.
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argued that by 1979 gold had "ro-established its
roleap the principal reserve asset" 4
Thd higher price was increasingly recognized in
countries' calculation of their own reserves, as
more and more countries adopted some market-
related method of calculating the value of gold
reserves and abandoned the use of the old official
price.' The allocation of European Currency Units
against gold, with gold valued at the London mar-
ket price, provided a means of realizing on the
higher price of gold without actually selling it.
One of the questions about the significance of the
higher price of gold is whether it could be sus-
tained if monetary authorities actually supplied
gold freely to the market in the same way they sup-
plied dollars in times of payments deficits. Despite
the resilience of the gold market in the face of
sales by the IMF Trust Fund, the U. S. Treasury,
and other monetary authorities, gold has
remained "at the bottom of the pile" for most
governments.' The issuance by the European
Monetary System of European Currency Units
against gold valued at the market price is, in this
light, a potentially important way of remonetizing
gold without disturbing its market price.' The con-
tribution of the European Monetary System to a
revitalized role for gold may in fact turn out to be
one of its principal long-term effects.
A Return to the Gold Standard?
A possible return to the gold standard is a subject
that attracts many popular writers on monetary
'John Makinson, "Concealed Buffer for Central Banks,"
Financial Times, 30 July 1980, supplement on gold (hereafter
cited Makinson). See also IMF Annual Report 1980, p. 59,
table 14; gold accounted for 57 percent of the total value of
world reserves in May 1980. By March 1983 its share had fallen
to 52 percent. IMF Annual Report 1983, p. 68, table 14. See
also BIS 50th Report 1980, p. 151. The BIS points out the
difficulty of establishing "the actual increase in the effective
value of gold reserves." Ibid. p. 150.
'Joseph Gold, Floating Currencies, SDRs, and Gold: Futher
Legal Developments (IMF Pamphlet Series, no. 22, 1977), pp.
52-54; Joseph Gold, SDRs, Gold and Currencies* ThirdSurvey
of New Legal Developments (IMF Pamphlet Series, no. 26,
1979), pp. 33-34; Makinson surveys national gold pricing prac-
tices as of July 1980.
'Canada sold gold in 1980. Bundesbank Annual Report
1979, p. 58; "Canada To Sell More Gold from Reserves,"
Financial Times, 6 August 1980. IMF gold sales ceased in 1980.
IMFAnnual Report 1983, p. 88, table 22.
'On the effect of the use of gold market valuation of ECUs,
see IMF A nnual Report 1980, p. 60.
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affairs and some economists as well. Interest in
such a return rises when inflation seems most
serious because the gold standard repfesents
financial probity and price stability. But few advo-
cates spell out exactly what they mean by "the"
gold standard, apparently assuming that everyone
understands by that term the perfectly automatic
system that operated before World War I. This
mythical gold standard is believed to have func-
tioned without the aid of human hands, particu-
larly those of central bankers and finance
ministers. When examined more critically, it
reveals itself as a form of sterling standard which
exhibited many features that we normally think of
as recent developments, such as floating exchange
rates, intervention in exchange markets, and cen-
tral bank lending and borrowing. Nonetheless, the
myth of the self-regulating gold standard was
widely believed at the time, or at least was hastily
created after the demise of the gold standard at the
onset of World War 1.1
The increasing popularity of proposals for a
return to the gold standard represents more an
expression of lack of confidence in money and in
the economic policies of contemporary govern-
ments than any concrete plan for a radical reform
of the international monetary system.' Any specific
proposal by a government for a return to the pre-
World War I gold standard would be met by a
host of practical objections. Proponents of a gold
standard rarely make clear how, in democracies,
voters and interest groups can be persuaded to
abandon the insistence on government action-
responsibility for employment, interest rate
policy, social welfare transfers, and all of the
other policy objectives that led to the abandon-
ment of the interwar version of the gold standard
in the 1930s. Political innocence about govern-
ment spending and monetary policy was lost, and
it is difficult to see how it can be reestablished.
Opponents of a gold standard proposal would
surely point to the great volatility of the gold price
in recent years as making gold a singularly inap-
propriate anchor to which to tie not only a new
international monetary system but also the fate of
each national economy. To meet this point it is
'See Kenneth W. Dam, The Rules of the Game: Reform and
Evolution in the International Monetary System (1982), pp.
14-40, especially pp. 15-17.
'See, however, the proposals in Arthur B. Laffer, Reinstate-
ment of the Dollar: The Blueprint, Economic Study, A. B.
Laffer Associates (29 February 1980), pp. 3-5.
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often proposed that the principal central banks
peg th; price of gold.
The'difficulties faced by the IMF's commodity
stabilization and buffer stock plans suggest the
difficulties that any gold-pegging plan might
encounter. Such proposals confront two kinds of
problems. The first is the economic problem of
how to make such a pegging operation successful.
Much of course would turn on the initial price
chosen. Although the recent volatility of the gold
price makes a correct choice difficult, the diffi-
culties can be exaggerated. The price was success-
fully pegged throughout the Bretton Woods peri-
od. Governments have, in principle, an unlimited
amount of their own currency available to support
the price of gold, though they may have to pay
inflationary consequences if they in effect print
money to do so. Many have vast stocks of gold
available for sale to prevent the gold price from
rising. The Fund's gold might be used in support
of such an agreement. A product in which reserve
stocks are roughly forty times as large as annual
production is obviously different from commodi-
ties like tin or coffee.
The second problem involved in pegging the
gold price arises from the legal and institutional
arrangements for sharing the burden of doing so.
The United States unilaterally undertook that
burden at Bretton Woods, even though it did not
stand ready to buy and sell at the $35 per ounce
price except in transactions with official institu-
tions. Only later did burden sharing arise, and that
was because the private market price was pegged.
The Gold Pool of 1961 was the device through
which this sharing was accomplished, though it
broke down in 1968 when the two-tier system was
adopted."
The largest problem connected with burden
sharing, and hence with any policy of gold price
pegging, is the underlying exchange rate scheme.
The greater the reliance on exchange rate changes
and particularly on floating, the more complicated
must be the arrangements for allocation of the
responsibility for intervention and for risk of loss.
Moreover, each exchange rate change becomes a
gold price change in at least one country. Hence,
the greater the volatility of exchange rates, the
greater the opportunities for speculation in gold
markets and the more often the resolve of the
pegging central banks is likely to be tested.
"On the Gold Pool, see Dam, Rules of the Game, pp.
137-38.
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The pegging of the gold price, however success-
ful, would not constitute a return to tio gold
standard. Accomplishment of the goals of many
gold standard proponents would require some
more direct link between national currencies and
gold. A system in which countries can escape the
discipline envisaged by gold standard advocates
through repeated devaluations offers few advan-
tages. Indeed, it would merely put the world back
in the same position that all countries other than
the United States were in during the Bretton
Woods period. The pro-1914 gold standard
involved redemption of currency in gold at the
instance of private parties and the circulation of
gold coin as well. And it also involved a direct link
between the money supply, or at least the supply
of currency, and the quantity of gold in the coffers
of the monetary authorities. As Edward M. Bern-
stein has noted, "The significant characteristic of
the classical gold standard was not that the cur-
rency was defined in terms of gold or even that it
was redeemable (convertible) in gold, but that the
expansion of the money supply was limited by the
gold reserves."" It takes a considerable stretch of
imagination to conceive of modern governments
agreeing to accept any such constraints on their
economic policies, and an even greater leap of
faith to expect any such agreement to gain the
credibility that would be necessary for long-run
success. Who would believe that modern govern-
ments would continue to tie their hands with these
gold standard obligations in the face of popular
dissatisfaction and electoral opposition?
For these reasons it is unlikely that a return to a
gold standard could be accomplished through tech-
nocratic reform, and especially through multilateral
diplomatic negotiations. But a return by national
action in one or two key countries is not inconceiv-
able. It might become possible if unprecedentedly
high rates of inflation were destroying the fabric
of political life and creating a social revolution in
even advanced industrialized countries. The condi-
tions might then be created in which the govern-
ment and the people would be willing to forgo the
luxury of flexibility in fiscal and monetary policies
and submit themselves to the external control of
an arbitrary and unyielding external standard like
gold for the sake of economic and social stability.
The runaway German inflation of 1923 was
"Edward M. Bernstein, "The History of the International
Monetary Fund, 1966-71," Finance and Development 14
(December 1977): 17.
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brought to a halt in part through the device of
purpoqedly backing the currency with land; that it
might dot work or was at base legerdemain did not
matter to the populace, which was ready to accept
anything that might bring the juggernaut of
inflation to a halt. Surely a gold standard is a
more plausible and rational economic mechanism
than the German rentenmark scheme."
The fact that the gold standard developed at the
national level and became an international system
only through the interaction of separate national
systems rather than through any international
agreement lends some plausibility to the notion of
a gold standard starting in one country and then,
having proved itself there, spreading into an inter-
national system through emulation by other coun-
tries. Yet what country would be first? Any coun-
try so racked with inflation that it would be pre-
pared to accept the rigors of the gold standard
would surely long since have lost most of its re-
serves, unless it had previously refused to inter-
vene to support its exchange rate. Certainly the
United States would find it difficult to move to a
gold standard in the pre-1914 sense since its
reserves, measured net of external liabilities, are
negative, even when gold is valued at the market
price." Thus, even the notion of a gold standard,
spreading outward from one or two successful
countries, is probably only a nostalgic fairy tale.
On the other hand, the nostalgia for a gold
standard might be an important factor supporting
a return to a fixed-rate system. Against the back-
ground of the floating period since 1973, a fixed-
rate system with several governments willing to
support their currencies through gold sales in
addition to foreign exchange market intervention
"On the rentenmark scheme, see Leland B. Yeager, Interna-
tional Monetary Relations: Theory, History and Policy, 2d ed.
(1976), p. 315; William Adams Brown, Jr., The International
Gold Standard Reinterpreted 1914-1934 (1940), 1:362-65.
"In the first quarter of 1978, gross U. S. reserves (including
gold valued at the official rate) were $19.2 billion; external
liabilities were $207.2 billion. Even after valuing the gold com-
ponent at a later market price figure of $500 per ounce, gross
reserves amounted to no more than $146.2 billion, still less
than external liabilities. IMF, International FinancialStatistics
33 (July 1980): 402-3. By February 1982 (the most recent
period for which IFS carries a figure for U. S. external liabil-
ities) the disparity between reserves and external liabilities was
even greater, for gold holdings had declined as had the market
price. U.S. gross reserves, including gold valued at the official
rate, were $30.1 billion, while external liabilities were $360.1
billion. IMF, International Financial Statistics 35 (August
1982):426-27.
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could be presented under the gold standard ban.
ner. But it would be far from the pro-1914Aodel.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that a radickl solu-
tion, either a return to the gold standard or a
comprehensive reconstruction of the international
monetary system, is a likely outcome for the
1980s. The more probable lines of development
lie, as so often in the past, along the two
competing paths of reform and evolution. Down
the reform path lie further legal and institutional
efforts to promote the Special Drawing Right, the
IMF's reserve asset created in 1969, and to bring
the IMF back to the center of the international
monetary system by expanding its borrowing and
lending power and perhaps its regulatory power.
Down the evolutionary path might lie a movement
toward a multiple reserve currency system, despite
recent weakening of this trend.'4
Progress along either path is likely to involve
new levels of complexity in legal rules. The period
since 1945 has shown that an international system
of rules such as that formulated at Bretton Woods
requires pragmatic, evolutionary interpretation as
well as occasional constitutional reform. Some of
the changes merely gave shape and meaning to
existing rules, but others were of such originality
that no one at the Bretton Woods negotiating
table could have foreseen them. Attempts to adapt
the system to changing circumstances and to incor-
porate the contributions of institutions and organ-
izations legally external to it produced unprece.
dented and successful innovations such as the
General Arrangements to Borrow and, for a time,
the Gold Pool. Attempts at root-and-branch
reform produced a new international financial
instrument, the SDR. Neither evolution nor
reform could prevent the breakdown of the Bret-
ton Woods System in the early 1970s, but the
arrival of floating exchange rates was accom-
panied by the intensive reform negotiations in the
IMF and by development of an alternative
European "system."" The changes and crises of
the late 1970s and early 1980s have produced a
host of proposals for new rules, but all are far
from the self-adjusting system of the idealized
gold standard in the legendary past.
"IMFAnnual Report 1983, p. 72, table 16, and p. 73.
"On the IMF, see Dam, Rules of the Game, ch. 7, "Reform
and the Committee of Twenty," pp. 211-52; on the European
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